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Abstract
This Article discusses the GATT panel reports on Section 337, the U.S. reaction to the GATT
findings and possible amendments to Section 337 that would put the United States in compliance
with its international obligations. Taking into account the difficult balancing act necessary to
change Section 337 the authors attempt to take these requirements into account in suggesting
ways out of the quandary in which the United States and its trading partners now find themselves.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 7, 1989, the United States announced the
adoption of a 1988 panel report of the Council of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")' on section 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930 ("Section 337").2 Until the November 7

announcement, the United States had blocked the adoption of
the 1988 GATT panel report (the "1988 GATT Panel Report"), despite heavy criticism from other states party to the
agreement.' The reasons for the U.S. concern with the 1988
GATT Panel Report on Section 337, the prime weapon used
by the United States to block importation of goods that infringe U.S. intellectual property rights, were contained in a
statement made by U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills.4
* Partner, Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon, Washington, D.C.; B.A.,

Northwestern University; J.D., George Washington University.
* * Associate, Anderson, Mori & Rabinowitz, Tokyo, Japan; Foreign Legal Intern, Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon, Washington, D.C.; LL.B., Tokyo
University; LL.M., Harvard University; Member, 2d Tokyo Bar Association.
1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. (pts. 5 & 6) A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
GATT]. GATT has been amended several times since 1947. For a complete list of
these amendments, see GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, STATUS OF

LEGAL INSTRUMENTS (GATT/LEG/I) (reflecting amendments through April 1988).
An updated version of the text of GATE can be found in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS

(1969).

2. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Ambassador Hills Announces
Gatt Council's Adoption of Panel Report on Section 337 (Nov. 7, 1989) (copy of release on
file at the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal office); see 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
45, at 1466-67 (Nov. 15, 1989) (noting U.S. adoption under protest of GATT panel
report); see also United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Report by the
Panel (Nov. 23, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 GATE Panel Report] (copy on file at the
Fordham InternationalLaw Journal office). See generally Tariff Act of 1930 § 337, Pub. L.
No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988)).
3. 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 634 (May 17, 1989) (noting criticism by
the European Community, Japan, and Canada of U.S. failure to accept 1988 GATT
Panel Report on Section 337).
4. Statement by Ambassador Hills on Section 337 and Enforcement of Intellec-
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Ambassador Hills stated:
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, is one of
our strongest tools for the enforcement of intellectual property rights against infringing imports. Because of special
difficulties in enforcing rights against unfairly traded imports, we have procedural rules that apply only to imports.
We believe that these procedural rules are necessary to effectively enforce our intellectual property laws against imports.5
Indeed, Section 337 has been an important trade statute.
In seeking to prevent unfair practices in the import trade, Section 337 gives the U.S. International Trade Commission (the
"ITC" or the "Commission") the power to exclude articles
from entry into the United States6 and to order persons over
whom the Commission has jurisdiction to cease and desist
from unfair practices. 7 While the statute contains broad language involving "unfair acts," 8 Congressional reports noted
that one U.S. Government Accounting Office study found that
at least ninety-five percent of Section 337 cases involved intellectual property rights. 9
From the complainant's point of view, Section 337 provides a strong tool. In addition to remedies available in federal
district court, complainants are able to get a "second bite at
the apple" at the ITC. Significantly, complainants receive this
second bite at the apple with strict statutory time limitstwelve months, or in more complicated cases, eighteen
monthso0 -and with few problems of personal jurisdiction.'I
tual Property Rights (Nov. 7, 1989) (copy on file at the Fordham InternationalLawJournal office).
5. Id.
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(e) (1988).
7. Id. § 1337()-(g).
8. Id. § 1337(a).
9. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,at 155 (1987); S. REP. No.
71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1987).
10. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1988).
11. See Sealed Air Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976,
985-86 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that personal jurisdiction is not required under
§ 1337 exclusion orders). The 1988 GATT Panel Report noted that
[u]nder Section 337, it is not necessary to establish inpersonam jurisdiction
over all parties, as is required for federal district court litigation, except with
respect to cease and desist orders directed against a party. The jurisdiction
of federal district courts under existing law extends only to parties that can
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It is no wonder that the United States vigorously defends this
weapon of U.S. companies.
This Article discusses the GATT panel reports on Section
337,12 the U.S. reaction to the GATT findings, and possible
amendments to Section 337 that would put the United States
in compliance with its international obligations. In proposing
changes to Section 337, the authors are aware of the difficult
balancing act that is necessary. On the one hand, an attempt
must be made to comply with a sometimes confusing GATT
panel decision. On the other hand, any legislative changes
must take into account the popularity of Section 337 with U.S.
companies and with U.S. government officials, and with the
consequent need for an amended statute to provide timely and
effective remedies against infringing imports. The authors
have attempted to take these requirements into account in suggesting ways out of the quandary in which the United States
and its trading partners now find themselves.
I. THE GATT PANELS' DECISIONS ON SECTION 337
The event that triggered the November 7, 1989, announcement by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(the "USTR") regarding Section 337 was the 1988 GATT
Panel Report that found Section 337 to be in violation of U.S.
obligations under Article III:4 of the GATT because Section
337 did not provide national treatment 13 for imported
be served with valid process in accordance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Under Section 337, the proceeding is initiated by publication of the notice of the institution of the investigation in the Federal Register. In addition, copies of the complaint and of the notice in the Federal
Register are mailed to all respondents named in the notice and to the government of each country of foreign respondents.
1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 2, at 10, 2.8(iv).
12. In addition to the 1988 GATT Panel Report, a GATT panel previously had
addressed Section 337 in a report of May 26, 1983. See United States-Import of Certain

Automotive Spring Assemblies, Report of the Panel, adopted May 26, 1983 (L/5333), in
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE,

BASIC INSTRUMENTS

AND SELECTED

107 (30th Supp. (1984)) [hereinafter 1983 GATT Panel Report].
13. The National Treatment doctrine is one of the cornerstones of GATT. Article III:4 of GATT states that
[t]he products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use.
DOCUMENTS
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goods.1 4 This 1988 GATT Panel Report, however, was not the
first GATT panel to address Section 337. In 1983, another
GATT panel had adopted a report that upheld the U.S. application of Section 337. t5 While many of the same arguments
were made to the GATT panels in the 1983 and 1988 cases,
those panels came to diametrically opposed results regarding
the conformity of Section 337 to GATT requirements. A first
step in analyzing the U.S. obligations under GATT must be to
understand the bases of the two GATT panel decisions.
A. The 1983 GATT Panel Report-CertainAutomotive
Spring Assemblies
The GATT panel that considered the Spring Assemblies
grew out of a request by the Government of Canada. 7
The terms of reference of the GATT panel were
[t]o examine, in light of the relevant GATT provisions, the
exclusion of imports of certain automotive spring assemblies by the United States under Section 337 of the United
States Tariff Act of 1930 and including the issue of the use
of Section 337 by the United States in cases of alleged patent infringement. 8
case 16

The Canadian government made clear that its objective in
bringing the case was not just to seek redress in the particular
spring assemblies case, but to attack generally the differential
treatment of imports under Section 337.19 Among the specific
Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 62 Stat. (pt. 3) at 3679, 3681, T.I.A.S. No. 1890, at 4, 62 U.N.T.S. 80, 82
(Sept. 14, 1948) [hereinafter GATT Amendment] (amending GATT, supra note 1,

art. III, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) at A18, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 14, 55 U.N.T.S. at 206). An
interpretive note supplementing this provision states that "any law, regulation or requirement .

.

. which applies to an imported product .

.

. and is collected or ...

enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point of importation, is
... subject to the provisions of article III." GATT Amendment, supra, 62 Stat. (pt. 3)
at 3689, T.I.A.S. No. 1890, at 14, 62 U.N.T.S. at 104 (amending GATT, supra note 1,
.61 Stat. (pt. 5) at A85, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 81, 55 U.N.T.S. at 292).
14. 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 2, at 64, 6.3.
15. See 1983 GATT Panel Report, supra note 12.
16. See id. at 109-11,
8-13 (providing background of Spring Assemblies case).
For prior history of this case, see In the Matter of Spring Assemblies and Computers,
USITC Pub. 1172, Inv. No. 337-TA-88 (Aug. 1981) (issuance of general exclusion
order excluding all infringing spring assemblies).
17. 1983 GATT Panel Report, supra note 12, at 108.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 111,
14.
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complaints raised by the Canadian authorities were the duplication of proceedings with federal district court litigation,20
the different rules of evidence at the ITC,2 ' statutory time limits in Section 337 cases that do not exist in district court patent
litigation, 22 and the unavailability of counterclaims for respondents appearing at the ITC.2 3
In response to the arguments of Canada, the United States
maintained that Article XX(d) of GATT-the "necessity
clause" 2 4 -provided a general exception from the obligations
of GATT for the adoption or enforcement of measures which
were necessary to secure compliance with domestic laws and
regulations. 25 The necessity of Section 337 was said to result
from the difficulty in obtaining jurisdiction over foreign parties
in enforcing judgments against them in U.S. courts.2 6
In light of the arguments made by the parties, the conclusions of the GATT panel were strangely silent on important
issues. The framework of the reasoning of the panel was set
out as follows:
The Panel came to the conclusion that its first step should
be to consider whether or not the exception provision of
Article XX(d) applied in this case. The Panel considered
that if Article XX(d) applied, then an examination of the
question of the consistency of the exclusion order with the
other GATT provisions cited above would not be required.2 7
20. Id. at II1-12, 16.
21. Id. at 113, 19.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The relevant part of Article XX(d) provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures
. . . necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not

inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating
to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies .... the protection of
patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices.

GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(d), 61 Stat. (pt. 5) at A60-61, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 57,
55 U.N.T.S. at 262 (emphasis added).
25. 1983 GATT Panel Report, supra note 12, at 121, 41.
26. Id.

27. Id. at 124,

50.
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In other words, the panel did not examine whether each of the
Section 337 issues raised by Canada, such as the statutory time
limits, had merit, but instead addressed only whether the remedy, the exclusion order before it, was necessary. 28 This approach is in sharp contrast to the reasoning found in the 1988
Panel Report. 29
In reaching its conclusion that an exclusion order was necessary, the panel examined whether "a satisfactory and effective alternative existed under civil court procedures which
would have provided . . .a sufficiently effective remedy." ' 30
The panel concluded that had the ITC complainant pursued its
relief only in district court, it could have prevented only parties
to the action, and not unknown users, from utilizing infringing
spring assemblies. 3 ' In view of "the relatively simple manufacturing process used to produce automotive spring assemblies, ' 32 the panel found that relying only upon district court
remedies would have created major difficulties for the complainant. In making its determination, the panel cautioned
that there could be situations in which it would be practical to
resort to federal court remedies alone, without the need for an
exclusion order. 4
The Spring Assemblies decision was a victory for the United
States, but barely so. By narrowly focusing on the remedy issue and the necessity of an exclusion order in the particular
case before it, the GATT panel simply refused to address several of the major complaints raised by Canada-the issues that
foreign companies find most disturbing-concerning ITC procedure, time limits, and dual proceedings.3 Yet even while
28. Id. at 124-28, 7 49-73 (noting panel's conclusions).
29. See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
30. 1983 GATT Panel Report, supra note 12, at 126, 58.
31. Id. at 126, 59.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 126, 60.
34. Id. at 127, 66. The report stated:
The Panel did not, therefore, exclude the strong possibility that there might
be cases, for example, involving high-cost products of an advanced technical
nature and with a very limited number of potential users in the United
States, where a procedure before a United States court might provide the
patent holder with an equally satisfactory and effective remedy ....
Id.
35. As to duplication of proceedings at the ITC and in the district court, the
Panel merely "observed that there might be merit in consideration being given to
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upholding the exclusion order in this particular case, the panel
plainly was concerned with the possible misuse of broad ITC
exclusion orders in cases where the necessity of exclusion orders was not readily apparent. Because of the failure to address these crucial concerns, a new GATT challenge to Section
337 was almost inevitable.
B. The 1988 GATT Panel Report-CertainAramid Fiber
The new challenge to Section 337 under GATT came
about as a result of an exclusion order issued against Akzo
N.V. of the Netherlands, based upon infringement of a process
patent held by E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company of the
United States. 6 The European Community requested a
GATT panel to make findings regarding Section 337 in general and in the Certain Aramid Fiber case in particular.3 7 However, as a result of a settlement agreement between Akzo and
DuPont, the European Community later withdrew its request
for specific findings in that case.3 8
The scope of the complaint addressed by the GATT panel
encompassed whether the United States had failed to carry out
its obligation to grant national treatment, by providing goods
of non-U.S. origin less favorable treatment than U.S. goods ensimplifying and improving the legal procedures for patent infringement cases." Id. at
128, 73.
The possibility of a foreign corporation having to defend in two fora, with time
limits only at the ITC evoked the loudest complaints because the result of this
"double jeopardy" was to provide a major tactical advantage to complainants. Canada was clearly concerned with this double jeopardy issue, arguing that
[a]s regards patent infringement by domestic producers, the remedy open
to a patent holder was to sue in the United States federal courts. This recourse was also available in respect of foreign producers, in addition to
bringing a complaint under Section 337, and could be pursued before, during or after a Section 337 investigation. Foreign producers and others engaged in the import trade were thus not only subject to an inherently discriminatory process under Section 337 but were exposed to double jeopardy.
Id. at 112,
16.
36. See 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 2, at 13, 2.9 (detailing history of
Certain Aramid Fibre case). For prior history of this case, see In Matter of Certain
Aramid Fiber, USITC Pub. 1824, Inv. No. 337-TA-194 (March 1986) (issuance of
limited exclusion order against AKZO); Akzo N.V. v. USITC, 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987) (U.S. Court of Appeals affirming ITC's
exclusion order).
37. 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 2, at 14, 3.1.
38. Id.
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joyed in U.S. federal district courts. 9 The panel found that
the United States had failed to fulfill this obligation. 40 In rendering its decision, the panel reversed the logic used by the
Spring Assemblies panel. The Aramid Fiber panel refused to examine the necessity clause prior to deciding whether the U.S.
practice met the general requirement of national treatment
under Article III:4.41 The panel noted that the necessity clause
was a limited and conditional exception.4" It found that more
was required than merely determining that Section 337 as a
system was necessary.4 3
The panel noted that Article III:4 makes no distinction between substantive and procedural laws and regulations.4 4 Not
surprisingly, the panel gave short shrift to the U.S. argument
that Article III should be interpreted in a manner that would
allow a country to take away procedurally what it had supposedly given substantively.
The panel found that the United States did not accord national treatment under Section 337 in patent-based cases, for
the following reasons:
(i) the availability to complainants of a choice of forum in
which to challenge imported products, whereas no corresponding choice is available to challenge products of
United States origin;
(ii) the potential disadvantage to producers or importers of
challenged products of foreign origin resulting from
the tight and fixed time-limits in proceedings under
Section 337, when no comparable time-limits apply to
producers of challenged products of United States origin;
(iii) the non-availability of opportunities in Section 337
proceedings to raise counterclaims, as is possible in
proceedings in federal district court;
(iv) the possibility that general exclusion orders may result
39. Id.
40. Id. at 58, 5.20.
41. Id. at 50, 5.9.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 60, 5.27. The report stated: "The Panel did not accept this contention since it would permit contracting parties to introduce GATT inconsistencies that
are not necessary simply by making them part of a scheme which contained elements
that are necessary." Id.
44. Id. at 50, 5.10.
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from proceedings brought before the USITC under
Section 337, given that no comparable remedy is available against infringing products of United States origin;
(v) the automatic enforcement of exclusion orders by the
United States Customs Service, when injunctive relief
obtainable in federal court in respect of infringing
products of United States origin requires for its enforcement individual proceedings brought by the successful plaintiff; and
(vi) the possibility that producers or importers of challenged products of foreign origin may have to defend
their products both before the USITC and in federal
district court, whereas no corresponding exposure exists with respect to products of United States origin. 4 5
The panel then examined this lack of national treatment in
light of the necessity clause.4 6 The United States raised the
defense of necessity with regard to Section 337 as a whole,
rather than making individual "necessity" arguments to
counter the European Community's allegations of discrimination based on the national origin of the goods. 47 Apparently,
the United States felt constrained in its arguments because
Section 337 cases can be brought only by a U.S. industry.
The panel examined the U.S. defenses that were
presented and concluded that limited exclusion orders were
justified as necessary for imported products and that general
exclusion orders could be justified under some circumstances.4 8 It also found that automatic enforcement of exclusion orders by the Customs Service was necessary to render
orders effective. 49 Finally, the time limits for Section 337 were
found not to be necessary under Article XX.5 ° While the panel
45. Id. at 58, T 5.20. Section 337 may raise national treatment questions under
other international agreements as well. See Palmeter, The U.S. InternationalTrade Commission at Common Law, 18J. WORLD TRADE 497, 510 n.61 (1984) (discussing possible
violation of Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual
Property).
46. See 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 2, at 59-63, TT 5.22-35.
47. Id. at 36.
48. Id. at 62, T$ 5.31-.32. Limited exclusion orders involve infringing products
produced by respondents, while general exclusion orders involve infringing products
produced by any person. Id. at 56, 5.19.
49. Id. at 62, T 5.33.
50. Id. at 63, 5.34.
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recognized that Section 337 relief was only prospective, with
the consequent need for an expeditious decision, it found that
"this argument could only provide a justification for rapid preliminary or conservatory action against imported products,
combined with the necessary safeguards to protect the legitimate interests of importers in the event that the products
prove not to be infringing."'" No justification was found for
the tight time-limits allegedly needed to conclude Section 337
cases.

52

II. THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT-U.S. DELAY IN
IMPLEMENTING THE PANEL DECISION
UNDERMINES THE U.S. POSITION ON
OTHER ISSUES BEFORE THE
GATT
The United States has been, to put it mildly, cautious in its
approach to implementation of the 1988 GATT panel findings
regarding Section 337. Although the USTR finally adopted
the 1988 GAT Panel Report's findings in November 1989,
the United States has tied its actions on implementation of the
panel report to progress in the Uruguay Round regarding intellectual property rights. 5 While the United States concern
for progress on intellectual property rights in the Uruguay
Round is understandable, it is a bit difficult to decipher the
logical link between Section 337 reform and the Uruguay
Round. Is the United States seriously suggesting that national
treatment should not be applicable to intellectual property
cases? If not, how will any reforms in the Uruguay Round affect changes that must be made in Section 337 to bring it into
conformance with GATT? The apparent lack of connection
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1467 (Nov. 15, 1989) (noting U.S.
Ambassador Rufus Yerxa's comments that "[a]doption of the [1988 GATT Panel]
report . . . does not automatically change Section 337, and any changes in the law
would be affected by ongoing negotiations in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations"). SenatorJohn Heinz, in a speech before the Washington International Trade

Association stated that the United States "would continue enforcing Section 337
without change, pending enactment of legislation amending the section, 'which could
most effectively occur through Uruguay Round implementing legislation.' " Id. European Community Ambassador Tran Van Tinh noted that he was "unhappy with
continued linkage of the issue with the Uruguay Round talks." Id.
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between the GATT panel determination and the ongoing negotiations in the Uruguay Round raises another possibilitythat delay is being sought by the United States not because of
Uruguay Round progress, but for domestic political reasons.
Under the "fast track" provisions of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, the implementing bill for a trade
agreement coming out of the Uruguay Round will be extremely difficult to amend.5 4 By including Section 337 reform
in such a trade act, the U.S. Administration may be able to
avoid a floor fight in Congress led by members concerned with
protecting U.S. businesses.
Another possibility is that the United States will never
comply with the 1988 GATT panel determination. The U.S.
history of compliance with GATT panel decisions makes this
possibility disturbingly likely. A study by Professor Robert E.
Hudec analyzes GATT settlement proceedings for the nine
years after the end of the Tokyo Round-fromJanuary 1980 to
December 1988. 5 5 During that period, the only GATT member with more adverse panel rulings than the United States was
the European Community. 56
The eight violations found to have been committed by the
United States can be compared with the nine violations committed by the European Community, six by Canada, and the
four violations found to have been committed by Japan.5 7 Significantly, Professor Hudec found that Japan had substantially
complied with all four of the adverse rulings. On the other
hand the United States was not in substantial compliance with
the adverse rulings in at least half the cases. 58
A report to the GATT Council, released on December 14,
1989, reached conclusions similar to those of Professor
Hudec. 59 This report reviewed the trade policies of the United
54. See 19 U.S.C. § 2903(b) (1988) (providing for fast track procedures); see also
End Product of Uruguay Round Negotiations Won't Be Clear Until Mid-1990, Lavorel.Says, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 36, at 1156 (Sept. 13, 1989) (noting that agreements
reached in Uruguay Round fall under fast-track process, limiting Congressional consideration to 60-90 days).
55. R. Hudec, Study of U.S. Performance in GATT Dispute Settlement (to be
published by Butterworths (U.S.A.) in 1990).
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See "Trade Policy Review Mechanism: United States of America," Report of
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States and found that although the United States has historically complied with the majority of GATT rulings, the United
States has dragged its feet in bringing its programs into compliance with four recent GATT panel findings 6 -the
Superfund report ofJune 1987,61 the Customs-User Fee report
of February 1988,62 the Sugar Quota report of June 1989,63

and the Section 337 case.6 4 Ironically, had other countries
delayed implementation of a GATT finding similar to the Section 337 report, U.S. law would require retaliation under section 1303 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, better known as "Special 301."65
In Special 301, the U.S. Congress created a section of law
entitled "Identification of Countries that Deny Adequate Protection, or Market Access, for Intellectual Property Rights." '66
Under the*terms of Special 301, the USTR is to identify foreign
countries as "priority foreign countries ...

that have the most

onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices that-(i) deny
adequate and effective intellectual property rights, or (ii) deny
fair and equitable market access to United States persons that
rely upon intellectual property protection.

'67

Congress specified what it meant by denial of adequate or
effective protection. It said that
the Secretariat, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, C/RM/5/3, 16 Nov. 1989
[hereinafter GATT Trade Policy Report]; see also 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 50, at
1646 (Dec. 20, 1989) (noting that report was released on Dec. 14, 1989).
60. GATT Trade Policy Report, supra note 59, at 144.
61. United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances 136, Report of

the Panel, adopted June 17, 1987 (L/6175), in

GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (34th Supp. 1986-87). The

United States finally complied with this 1987 GATT Superfund report in December
1989. See Steel Trade Liberalization Program Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 101221, § 8, 103 Stat. 1886, 1891 (1989).
62. United States-Customs Users Fee, Report by the Panel, adopted February 2,

1988 (L/6264), in GENERAL
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS

AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS

245 (35th Supp. 1987-88).

63. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Sugar, Report of the Panel (June
9, 1989) (copy on file at the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal office).

64.
65.
§ 1303,
316, §§

1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 2.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
102 Stat. 1107, 1179 (1988) (amending Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93302(b), 182 (1974)) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
66. See 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988). Details and analysis of this complex statute are

set forth by Bliss, The Amendments to Section 301: An Overview and Suggested Strategiesfor
Foreign Response, 20 LAW AND POLICY INT'L Bus. 501 (1989).

67. 19 U.S.C.

§ 2242(b) (1988).
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[a] foreign country denies adequate and effective protection
of intellectual property rights if the foreign country denies
adequate and effective means under the laws of theforeign country for
persons who are not citizens or nationals of such foreign country to

secure, exercise, and enforce rights relating to patents, process patents, registered trademarks, copyrights and mask

works

68

The law goes on to state that a foreign country denies fair
and equitable market access if the country denies access
through laws, procedures, practices, or regulations which "violate provisions of international law or international agreements
to which both the United States and the foreign country are
'6 9
parties, or constitute discriminatory nontariff trade barriers.
There can be little doubt that U.S. laws, regulations, and
practices under Section 337 deny foreign citizens or nationals
adequate and effective means to secure, exercise, and enforce
their intellectual property rights. In fact, U.S. laws and practice have been found by a GATT panel to violate provisions of
GAT-an international agreement to which the United States
and foreign countries are parties.70 Thus, if the U.S. were to
have the same standards applied to it that it applies to the rest
of the world, it could expect to be a "priority foreign country"
for its denial of intellectual property rights.
Under U.S. law, once a country is identified as a "priority
foreign country," the USTR is required to initiate an investigation within thirty days.7 ' Within six months of the initiation of
an investigation, the USTR shall make a determination if the
dispute is not resolved.72
Of course the U.S. delay in implementing the GATT decision on Section 337 has languished well in excess of the seven
months that elapse between the identification of a country as
denying adequate and effective intellectual property rights and
the determination of the USTR. Thus, if the world intellectual
property regime that the United States envisions emerging out
of the Uruguay Round bears any resemblance to the U.S. law,
U.S. Section 337 practice would be a prime example of the
68. Id. § 2242(d)(2) (emphasis added).

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. § 2242(d)(3)(A)-(B).
See 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 2.
19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(A) (1988).
Id. § 2414(a)(3)(A).
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practice that would require retaliation. Under these circumstances the U.S. tying of Section 337 reform to Uruguay
Round practice can only be described as bizarre.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE SECTION 337
QUANDARY
There is little doubt that the GATT panel finding regarding Section 337 will require major changes in U.S. law if the
United States is to bring itself into compliance with its GATT
commitments. Any attempt to reform Section 337 must meet
the U.S. political requirement that the law remain as expeditious and effective as possible for intellectual property rights
holders, while meeting the objectives for change set out in the
73
1988 GATT Panel Report.
The authors address the following issues and suggest why
reforms would or would not be advisable in an attempt to meet
those requirements:
1. Opening up Section 337 to all intellectual property
rights holders, not just to U.S. companies;
2. Placing time limits only on the temporary relief phase
of a Section 337 determination, not on the final determination;
3. Allowing counterclaims at the ITC; and
4. Choosing alternative fora.
While the authors' conclusions, as set out below, do not
meet all of the objections of the GATT panel, point by point,
the changes may be enough to overcome the fundamental
charge-discrimination based on national origin-found in the
1988 GATT Panel Report. With these changes, it would be
possible for the United States to argue persuasively that any
differences between the treatment of imports under Section
337 and the treatment of goods in domestic commerce are
"necessary," because of the greater difficulties that are inherent in international commerce. While there is no guarantee
that a new GATT panel would accept such a U.S. argument, it
73. Because of the need for expeditious relief and the political difficulties in removing Section 337jurisdiction from the ITC, the authors have focused their suggestions on Section 337 reform on changes that would leave jurisdiction at the [[C yet

put the United States in a strong position to defend any new case regarding Section
337 before a GATT panel.
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appears to have a fairly good chance of success based on the
realities of international trade.
A. Opening Up Section 337 to All Intellectual Property Rights
Holders
Under the current Section 337, as amended by the 1988
Omnibus Trade Act, a Section 337 case may be brought by a
holder of a U.S. patent, copyright, trademark, or semiconductor mask work, only if that holder meets certain criteria regarding economic activity in the United States, The economic activity required concerns: (a) significant investment in plant and
equipment, (b) significant employment of labor or capital, or
(c) substantial investment in the property right's exploitation,
including engineering, research and development, or licensing.7 4 The requirements, however, are more stringent for Section 337 actions based on unfair practices outside of the intellectual property rights mentioned above. In such cases, the
complainant must show that the unfair method of competition
or unfair act has the threat or effect of destroying or substantially injuring an industry in the United States, preventing the
establishment of such an industry in the United States, or restraining or monopolizing trade and commerce in the United
States.75
While the criteria for intellectual property holders are
more relaxed than those for other Section 337 actions, neither
set of requirements can be said to confer national treatment on
potential foreign complainants. For example, if a Japanese
company with a U.S. patent wishes to utilize Section 337 to
stop the flow of infringing imports from another Far Eastern
country, it could do so only if it had a U.S. subsidiary and that
subsidiary could meet the significant investment or employment test specified in the statute.7 6 On the other hand, if the
same patent holder chose to import the merchandise from Japan and had no U.S. subsidiary, it probably would have no
standing under Section 337.77 This distinction, based solely
74. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (1988).
75. Id. § 1337(a)(1)(A).
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
77. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (1988). It is theoretically possible that, even without a U.S. subsidiary, a company could have enough activity involving the property
right's exploitation, such as licensing, to qualify as a domestic industry. This out-
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on the national origin of the goods, plainly is a violation of the
U.S. obligation to provide national treatment for foreign merchandise. As long as the United States fails to provide national
treatment to intellectual property right holders, it will be difficult for the United States to argue that Section 337 is "necessary" to protect its intellectual property system. With discrimination based on the national origin of the property holder, it is
apparent that it is not the intellectual property system that is
being protected, but U.S. companies.
Although the potential controversy that may result from
opening up Section 337 to purely foreign producers should
not be underestimated, the realities of Section 337 practice
make it unlikely that a massive increase in cases would occur.
As a practical matter, Section 337 already has been greatly liberalized as a result of the 1988 amendments. However, while
the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act expands the ability of foreign
complainants to bring Section 337 actions, it is not expansive
enough to overcome objections based on national treatment.
Thus, in a sense, the United States now has the worst of all
possible worlds.
Most Section 337 cases involve relatively low technology
items. Of the nineteen investigations decided or settled in
some manner in 1989, for example, only five appear to be relatively high technology cases. 7 8 The other fourteen investigations appear to involve relatively low technology products. 7 9
This fact is not surprising, since it is precisely these low techcome would appear, however, to be highly unusual and perhaps impossible as a practical matter since such activity is unlikely to be deemed "substantial."
78. The five cases were: (1) EPROMs, Components, Products Containing Such
Memories and Processes for Making Such Memories, USITC Pub. 2196, Inv. No.
337-TA-276 (May 1989); (2) Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, Inv.
No. 337-TA-281 (May 1989); (3) Cellular RadioTelephones, Inv. No. 337-TA-297;
(4) Phenylene Sulfide Polymers and Polymer Compounds, Inv. No. 337-TA-296; and
(5) Cryogenic Ultramicrotome Apparatus and Components, Inv. No. 337-TA-256.
79. The other fourteen cases were: (1) Strip Lights, Inv. No. 337-TA-287; (2)
Chemiluminescent Compositions and Components, Inv. No. 337-TA-285; (3) Small
Aluminum Flashlights and Components, Inv. No. 337-TA-254; (4) Plastic Light Duty
Screw Anchors, Inv. No. 337-TA-279; (5) Concealed Cabinet Hinges and Mounting
Plates, Inv. No. 337-TA-289; (6) Track-Lighting System Components, including Plug
Boxes, Inv. No. 337-TA-286; (7) Electric Power Tools, Battery Cartridges and Battery Chargers, Inv. No. 337-TA-284; (8) Food Treatment Ovens, Inv. No. 337-TA299; (9) Low Friction Drawer Supports, Inv. No. 337-TA-298; (10) Novelty
Teleidoscopes, Inv. No. 337-TA-295; (11) Carrier Materials Bearing Ink Compositions, Inv. No. 337-TA-294; (12) Straight Knife Cloth Cutting Machines, Inv. No.
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nology products that create significant problems of enforcement because they can be produced easily abroad.
The foreign holders of the largest number of U.S. patents,
however, are generally high technology companies.8 0 Thus,
unless foreign holders of patents are much more litigious than
U.S. companies, it seems unlikely that we will see a flood of
Section 337 actions brought by foreign-based companies
under a reformed Section 337.
B. Time Limits on Temporary Relief Would Accomplish Most U.S.
Goals and Meet GA TT Requirements
The European Community argued that the short time limits under Section 337 put respondents in a worse position than
complainants, pointing to the limited time which respondents
are given to prepare adequately. 8' Section 337 relief, however,
is prospective in nature. Unlike an action in federal district
court, which can result in the award of money damages that
covers past harm, relief under Section 337 can result only in an
exclusion order or in a cease and desist order, 2 which are
forms of relief that act only infuturo.
Because Section 337 relief is future oriented, relief that is
not expeditious may well be worthless. As a result ofjurisdictional problems with foreign respondents, relief that is delayed
may result in a complainant having no effective remedy against
infringing goods, particularly if the import is a product that has
a short life span, such as a toy, a video game, or increasingly,
even some high technology products. The United States,
therefore, has a legitimate interest in expeditious treatment of
Section 337 cases in order to protect its intellectual property
system.
The 1988 GATT panel found as follows regarding the
ITC time limits:
337-TA-288; (13) Electronic Dart Games, Inv. No. 337-TA-283; and (14) Venetian
Blind Components, Inv. No. 337-TA-282.
80. In 1988, only two of the ten companies that secured the most patents in the
United States were U.S. companies. The eight largest foreign-owned patent holders
were Hitachi, Toshiba, Canon, Fuji Photo, U.S. Philips, Siemens, Mitsubishi, and
Bayer. ECONOMIST, at 74 (Oct. 28, 1989). These foreign holders of U.S. patents
plainly have fewer rights to enforce their patents under Section 337 than do U.S.based holders of U.S. patents.
81. See 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 2, at 25-26,
3.29.
82. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(g) (1988).
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In the Panel's view, given the issues at stake in typical patent
suits, this argument could only provide a justification for
rapid preliminary or conservatory action against imported
products, combined with the necessary safeguards to protect the legitimate interests of importers83 in the event that
the products prove not to be infringing.
Based upon this panel finding, it appears that a reformed
Section 337 that establishes time limits only for temporary relief would pass GATT muster. With such a change, the final
determination of the ITC could take as long as necessary, as in
a U.S. district court proceeding. Under the provisions of Section 337(e) and (f), the mechanism is already in place to provide temporary relief generally within 90 days after the notice
of investigation is published or 150 days in a more complicated
84
case.
At least two problems, however, exist regarding the use of
time limits for only the temporary relief phase of the investigation. First, if temporary relief were not granted in a case where
it was later found that permanent relief was justified, a complainant would be severely damaged. The chances of such an
occurrence would be greatly diminished, however, if the U.S.
Congress were to specify standards that would be consistent
with district court practice regarding temporary relief, taking
into account the balance of hardship if relief is improvidently
denied.
A second problem regarding the use of time limits only
during the temporary relief phase arises from the GATT panel
requirement that there be necessary safeguards to protect importers' interests in the event that the product proves to be
non-infringing. 85 At present, temporary relief under Section
337 entails a simple requirement that the importer post a bond
to cover entries. 86 The Commission may, pursuant to the current law, also require a complainant to post a bond as a prerequisite to the issuance of a temporary exclusion order. 87 The
bonds posted by both complainants and respondents would
cover amounts owed to the U.S. government and would not be
83. 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 2, at 63,
84. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (e)-(f) (1988).
85. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
86. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(1).
87. Id. § 1337(e)(2).

5.34.
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paid to the opposing party. If this requirement became too
burdensome on importers, it could discourage legitimate requests for relief. Yet meeting the GATT requirement should
not be insurmountable. A change in Section 337 law to require that bonds go to the injured party, rather than to the
U.S. government, could help to provide an effective temporary
relief mechanism compatible with GATT.
A respondent's bond under an amended Section 337
could be posted in an amount that would compensate the complainant for losses during the pendency of the Section 337 action. If a respondent chooses to continue to .export goods to
the United States after the issuance of a temporary exclusion
order, it would be liable for losses caused to complainants who
prevail. Such losses often would be in the amount of lost profits.
On the other hand, if respondents ultimately prevail after
the issuance of a temporary exclusion order, complainants
would be required to compensate respondents for their losses.
Those losses most often would be the cost of the bond that
respondents were required to post.
A requirement that the bonded amounts be paid to the
opposing party, rather than to the government, would create a
more equitable temporary relief system that would avoid the
pitfalls of the current system, which is divorced from the economic effect on the opposing party. More importantly, a reform of the bonding provision could meet requirements that
temporary relief measures protect the interest of both parties
by providing quick and effective relief while protecting the legitimate interest of respondents.
C. Allowance of Counterclaims at the ITC
The 1988 GATT Panel Report also found that the inability
of a respondent to raise counterclaims in a Section 337 action,
a right a defendant has in federal district court actions, constituted less favorable treatment within the meaning of Article III
of the GATT.8 8 In order to bring U.S. law into compliance
with GATT, it appears that changes are necessary to remedy
the inability to bring counterclaims.
88. 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 2, at 56.
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A simple solution to the counterclaim problem appears to
be allowing counterclaims by respondents at the ITC, with any
determinations against complainants enforceable in federal
district court. The 1988 GATT Panel Report appears to hold
that complainants' tactical advantage in not having to defend
against counterclaims is what constitutes less favorable treat89
ment.
Nevertheless, allowing counterclaims at the ITC could
create serious problems. For example, if counterclaims were
allowed, with the possibility of money damages, there would
seem to be no need for the strict time limits for temporary relief that are necessary when the relief requested is an exclusion
order. As a result, relief would be likely to move at a very different pace for any counterclaims. Moreover, if counterclaims
were allowed at the ITC, there still would be a need to enforce
an award of money damages in federal district court. Such enforcement would appear to be a needless duplication of'effort.
It is unclear from the 1988 GATF Panel Report whether a
broader Section 337 that is available to all intellectual property
owners could disallow counterclaims and still be GATF-compatible based on the necessity clause.
Allowing counterclaims, either in the context of reformed
Section 337 cases brought at the ITC or reformed Section 337
cases brought in U.S. district court, could seriously undermine
the effectiveness of the Section 337 remedy. If cases remain at
the ITC, allowing counterclaims would provide respondents
with a greater remedy than the remedy available to complainants because complainants only have cause and desist orders
and exclusion orders available as remedies under Section 337.
GATT panel reports have twice upheld the use of exclusion orders as necessary to enforce intellectual property rights,
despite the fact that such exclusion orders by their very nature
can apply only to imports.9 0 ITC respondents already have the
right to bring actions against ITC complainants in federal district courts. On the other hand, if counterclaims are allowed at
the ITC, money damages would be available in that forum to
89. Id. The panel noted that the lack of counterclaims at the ITC "deprives the
respondent of an option that is available where products of United States origin
rather than imported products are concerned." Id.
90. See 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 2, at 61-62,
5.31-5.33; 1983
GATYF Panel Report, supra note 12, at 126, 60.
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only one party. Some might argue that U.S. district courts
should have jurisdiction over all Section 337 cases. But a statutory referral of Section 337 cases to U.S. district courts with
time limits may be subjected to constitutional scrutiny.9"
Under these conditions, the United States should be able to
make a strong argument that not allowing counterclaims at the
ITC is a necessary part of providing an effective Section 337
statute that is designed to protect the intellectual property system rather than U.S. producers, and thus the United States
should be able to defend the lack of counterclaims before any
new GATT panel.
D. Choice of Forum
Finally, the GATT Panel Report found that Section 337
was inconsistent with Article III of GATT because only complainants had a choice of forum.9 2 This could lead to the possibility that foreign producers or importers of challenged
products of foreign origin may have to defend their products
both before the ITC and in federal district court. While there
is little doubt that the possibility of dual defenses is a difference based on the origin of the goods, it appears to be necessary for an effective remedy. Because of the need for expeditious relief, it is necessary that Section 337 relief be placed at
the ITC, which does not face the potential constitutional
problems with time limits or preliminary relief that are faced in
the district courts. Because it is necessary to place Section 337
at the ITC for effective relief, it inevitably follows that the possibility of litigating in two fora will exist. Yet this possibility
seems necessary for effective relief under a new, revitalized
Section 337. If it is necessary under Article XX(d), it should
pass muster before any new GATT panel.
CONCLUSION
The 1988 GATT Panel Report on Section 337 presents a
major dilemma for U.S. trade policy in the intellectual prop91. A federal statute that places time limits on an adjudication by an Article III
court would seem to raise separation of powers concerns. But see United States v.
Brainer, 691 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1982) (upholding constitutionality of time limits imposed by Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1988)); Comment, The Speedy Trial
Act and Separation of Powers: United States v. Howard, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1925 (1978).
92. 1988 GATT Panel Report, supra note 2, at 58, 5.20(i).
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erty area. The United States has the dual interests of upholding the principle of national treatment while preserving an effective mechanism for expeditious relief. Major revisions of
Section 337 will be necessary to accomplish these goals, and,
as a result, much political controversy lies ahead.

